This note presents a simple algorithm for characterizing the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a broad class of entry games. The algorithm alleviates much of the computational burden associated with recently developed econometric techniques for estimating payoff functions inferred from entry games with multiple equlibria.
I. Introduction
There has been increasing interest in the estimation of payoff functions inferred from games in which agents choose from a discrete set of strategies that yield an observable profile of agents' decisions, Y, which is assumed to be generated according to a particular equilibrium concept. Several researchers have employed this type of model to infer the effect of competition on firms' profits by assuming that observed market structures are pure strategy Nash equilibria, ("PSNE"), of an entry game. If the game admits multiple PSNE, however, the empirical model is "incomplete" since a given parameter vector may map into more than one entry profile. Dating back at least to the work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992) , researchers have used different approaches to estimate entry models that admit multiple PSNE. Tamer (2003) forms an estimator that does not require one to "select" a particular PSNE by bounding the likelihood of a given Y by the probability that Y is the unique PSNE (lower bound) and the probability that Y is a PSNE (upper bound). Ciliberto and Tamer (2004, "CT") , and Andrews, Berry and Jia (2004, "ABJ") , have proposed similar estimators for multi-player games. These estimators are computationally intensive because they require one to recover the set of PSNE.
I show that when the effect of entry on firms' profits depends only on the number of entrants, the NxN matrix of best replies to each possible number of entrants can be manipulated to fully and succinctly characterize the set of PSNE. The method is feasible for a large number of potential entrants because it requires operating only on an NxN matrix, as opposed to operating on the Nx2 N matrix of all possible entry profiles. The algorithm is applicable only when the argument of each firm's profit function is the number of competing entrants, though the profit function is permitted to differ across firms. Whether or not such an assumption is valid will depend upon the application.
Section 2 discusses recently developed estimators for which a computationally efficient way of characterizing the set of PSNE in the entry game is of practical value.
Section 3 presents some theoretical results that underlie the computational algorithm presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
II. Estimation of Games with Multiple PSNE
Tamer ( Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) show that this game admits multiple PSNE if the error structure is sufficiently rich. In particular, for certain values of the parameters and unobservables, either firm may enter as a monopolist, but not both. Tamer (2003) bounds the likelihoods of both monopoly outcomes by applying different hypothetical "selection rules"
when the model predicts multiple PSNE. The lower bound, (1, 0) P , is the probability that
(1,0) is the unique PSNE; i.e., that (1,0) would never obtain in the region in which both (1, 0) and (0,1) are PSNE. The upper bound, (1,0) P , is the probability that (1,0) is simply a PSNE;
i.e., that (1,0) would always obtain in the region in which both (1,0) and (0,1) are PSNE.
CT extend this intuition to the multi-firm entry game using a modified minimum distance estimator in which the likelihood of Y is bounded by the probabilities that Y is the unique PSNE (lower bound) and that Y is any PSNE (upper bound). Simulation methods must be used to calculate these regions. The estimator is computationally burdensome because finding the PSNE entails checking N inequalities for each of the 2 N possible outcomes at each draw from the distribution of the unobservables. 1 The algorithm provided below can significantly reduce this burden.
III. Theory
Extending the specification in ( 
where ( ) i f ⋅ is assumed to be strictly decreasing in the number of entrants and ( ) 0
The model is slightly different from CT (and ABJ) in that the effect of entry on
∑ , depends only on the number of other entrants and not their identities. CT can estimate different parameters capturing the effect of a particular firm's entry on the profits of each of the other firms because they observe the same set of potential entrants across several markets. When the identities of the potential entrants vary across markets, however, estimating identity-specific shift parameters is infeasible. In this case, the specification in (3) would be more appropriate while still providing some flexibility since the number of entrants may affect each firm's profits differently.
All PSNE have in common that all entrants are profitable and no additional firm could profitably enter the market. That is:
( ) 
Proofs of all propositions are contained in the appendix. inequalities for each of 2 N possible entry profiles. The algorithm for doing so proceeds in three steps: (1) calculate the NxN matrix of best replies to each possible number of competing entrants; (2) find the number of entrants common to all PSNE using Proposition 1; and (3) determine whether a given profile is the unique PSNE, a PSNE (unique or not), or not a PSNE using the appropriate columns of the best reply matrix. The last step may be repeated to check all possible outcomes without repeating the first two steps.
IV. Computational Algorithm
Step 1: Compute the matrix of best replies to the number of competing entrants. Step 2: Find the equilibrium number of entrants, * N , using Proposition 1. 
A. Calculate the

Comment on Steps 1 and 2
When there are multiple PSNE: (1) firms that enter in every PSNE and firms that never enter in a PSNE will have values of one and zero, respectively, in the corresponding rows of both 
Example:
Suppose that
Any Y ∈ Λ must satisfy: (1) Step 3: Determine whether a desired profile of entry decisions, Y, is the unique PSNE, a PSNE, or not a PSNE.
A. Y is the unique PSNE if each element of Y is equal to the corresponding element of The simulation estimator of the upper and lower bounds on the probability of observing the profile Y is computed by repeating steps 1-3 for each pseudo-random draw, d, from the distribution of ε . In particular, the simulation estimator of the lower bound on the probability of observing Y is:
and the upper bound is:
where ( ) I ⋅ is the indicator function.
V. Conclusion
This note provides an algorithm that significantly expands the settings in which one may feasibly estimate the payoff parameters from entry games with multiple PSNE. Under the commonly used assumption that the effect of entry on profits depends only on the number of entrants, the NxN matrix of firms' best replies to entry by a given number of competitors fully characterizes the set of PSNE. In this case, one need not compute and operate on the 
